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Abstract: What skills or qualities with a philosophical practitioner are required 
in order to perform and facilitate good philosophical dialogues? Is good dialogue 
facilitation only a question of respective techniques or is the ethical attitude of 
the philosophical practitioner also of significant relevance? These questions are 
further investigated in this essay, and – as some sort of result – pointed out that 
the development of so-called phronesis (practical wisdom or mindfulness) with 
the philosophical practitioner plays a decisive role when he or she is facilitating 
dialogues and is a key feature in the art of philosophizing.  
Key words: Philosophical practice, phronesis, mindfulness, dialogue facilitation. 
 
Resumen: ¿Qué habilidades o cualidades, además de las inherentes a la práctica 
filosófica, son necesarias para llevar a cabo y facilitar buenos diálogos 
filosóficos? ¿Consiste la facilitación de un diálogo exclusivamente en un asunto 
de técnicas o se requiere una actitud ética también significativa? Estas cuestiones 
serán minuciuosamente investigadas en este trabajo y, como una suerte de 
resultado, se señalará que el desarrollo de la, así denominada, phronesis 
(sabiduría práctica o visión completa (mindfulness))  juega un rol decisivo en el 
orientador filosófico cuando facilita diálogos y, asimismo, constituye una 
característica clave en el arte de filosofar. 
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On the guiding question of this essay 
 
Quite early after it came into existence, the field of philosophical 
practice was marked by a great variety of approaches and 
concepts
1
. And with this diversity in terms of approaches, concepts 
and practices, an intense discussion about the essence of this new 
discipline came along
2
. Up until today, this discussion never came 
to a final answer or common conclusion. And maybe this is not 
even necessary, since different points of view allow for the 
discovery of new potentials and developments within the field.  
However, what all philosophical practices seem to have in 
common – and this is one of the basic assumption of this essay – is 
that they strive to offer ways to create, facilitate and perform 
dialogues
3
. What methodological structures, formats or even 
purposes these dialogue practices have, is of course another 
question. But a philosophical practice that manages without the 
performance of a dialogue (and one can also have a dialogue with 
oneself
4
) would be the ‘black swan’ among the philosophical 
practices currently available, so to say. Therefore, it appears that 
there is one feature in particular that all philosophical practitioners 
tacitly share (no matter, whether they work at schools, with 
counseling, in hospitals, prisons, at universities etc.): They all want 
to facilitate and perform good (philosophical) dialogues. And it is 
this aspect that this essay is dealing with – the performance of good 
philosophical dialogues. However, the intention behind this essay is 
                                                          
1 see LAHAV, Ran & DA VENZA TILLMANNS, Maria (eds.): Essays on Philosophical 
Counseling, Plymbridge Distributors Ltd., Gloucester, 1995. 
2 RAABE, Peter: Philosophical Counseling. Theory and Practice, Praeger Publishers, 
Santa Barbara, CA, 2001, p. 120f. 
3 see WEISS, Michael Noah (ed.): The Socratic Handbook. Dialogue Methods for 
Philosophical Practice, LIT Publishing, Vienna, 2015. 
4 see AMIR, Lydia: “The Tragic Sense of the Good Life“ or NIEHAUS, Michael: 
“Philosophy as a Way of Life. Exercises in Self-Care”, in WEISS, Michael Noah (ed.): 
The Socratic Handbook. Dialogue Methods for Philosophical Practice, LIT Publishing, 
Vienna, 2015. 
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not to evaluate and critically reflect the different methods and 
formats within philosophical practice, since as a format or method 
they all have ‘a right to exist’. Rather, the guiding question of 
investigation focuses more on the philosophical practitioner, who 
performs and facilitates dialogues and it reads:  
 
 What skills or qualities with the philosophical practitioner are 
required in order to perform and facilitate a good dialogue? 
 
In a certain respect, this question is a normative one. But before 
going into it, a closer look at the term ‘good dialogue’ is necessary. 
 
 
The good life – an analogy 
 
It is of course – at least to a certain extent – a sheer presupposition 
that all philosophical practitioners want to perform good dialogues. 
On the other hand, however, intending to perform a ‘weak’ or 
‘poor’ dialogue would simply make no sense. But even if one 
agrees that intending to perform poor or weak dialogues makes no 
sense, the question remains, what then is a good dialogue? Here an 
analogy to the Nichomachean Ethics of Aristotle seems to be useful 
in which he argues that the highest goal in life – shared by all 
human beings – is to live a good life
5
. However, even if we assume 
that Aristotle is right, the idea of what the good life is would differ 
from individual to individual. This seems to be similar with 
philosophical practitioners and their supposedly intention to 
perform good dialogues. However, even if we cannot give a 
common answer to what a good (philosophical) dialogue is, it can 
be a kind of guideline or normative idea, just like the good life is.  
 
                                                          
5 see ARISTOTLE: Nichomachean Ethics, 1097a. 
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The metaphor of the guitar players 
 
In order to further outline the direction in which I intend to go in 
this essay, I would like to use a metaphor – the metaphor of the 
guitar players: Obviously, there are guitar players, and there are 
great guitar players. There are those “Smoke on the Water”
6
-
players, who just began practicing, and then there are those who 
virtuously master their instruments (and there are of course also 
many in between). Then there are those who are well trained as 
well as those not so well trained, but who somehow inspire the 
listener with their playing. Then there are guitar players who play 
by notes, and others who improvise. In fact, there are incredibly 
many different ways of playing a guitar, both in terms of style and 
quality. And here the question comes up, how to improve one’s 
style and quality in order to become a great guitar player? Regular 
practice and years of experience seem to be important in this 
respect – but even if you are an experienced guitar player who 
practices frequently, then this is still no guarantee that your playing 
will become outstanding in style and quality. Maybe you too have 
once heard guitar players who possessed extraordinary playing 
techniques and skills to master their instrument while something 
was ‘still missing’ in order to call their playing inspiring – 
everything was ‘done right’, but still their playing did not sound 
very inspired. In other words, great guitar playing is not only a 
question of skills. There is more to it than the mastery of playing 





                                                          
6 “Smoke on the Water” is a song by the band Deep Purple. Its hook line is both an 
attracting Rock ‘n Roll tune as well as simple to play. Probably millions of youngsters 
began their guitar playing with this song.  
PHILOSOPHICAL MINDFULNESS 
HASER. Revista Internacional de Filosofía Aplicada, nº 8, 2017, pp. 91-123 
95 
Reframing the metaphor of the guitar players 
 
One could now ask what kind of qualities a guitar player needs in 
addition to experience and skills in order to become a great guitar 
player. For the moment, I would like to leave this question 
unanswered. Rather, I would like to reframe this metaphor of the 





For Aristotle the ability to play the lyre (a kind of Ancient guitar) 
fell within the realm of so-called techné
7
. Techné can be translated 
with technical knowledge or craftsmanship and even art. At first 
sight, it might not appear logical why Aristotle associates art with 
technical knowledge. But what he means is that art is both the 
knowledge and the skills to put an idea into reality, i.e. to proceed 
from an image that a painter has in his or her mind to the finished 
painting. The decisive point here is that already in the beginning of 
the ‘production process’ there is an idea of what the product in the 
end should ‘look like’ – and that idea is guiding the whole 
development process. In this sense Aristotle differed techné from 
episteme (theoretical knowledge) and phronesis (practical wisdom 
or moral knowledge) – on the latter we will have a closer look later. 
In a sense, techné represents not only know-how but also the 
capability to properly apply this know-how. In other words, technè 
is not only concerned with the knowledge of how to do or produce 
something (i.e. a vase or a house) but also with the acquisition of 
the skills and techniques necessary for doing that. The question 
now is, again, whether playing music or making art, is only a 
question of techné – or, to come back to the topic of dialoguing, 
                                                          
7 see ARISTOTLE: Magna Moralia, 1197a 33. 
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whether facilitating and performing a dialogue is simply a question 
of craftsmanship in the sense of techné. 
 
 
Dialogues are unpredictable 
 
The short answer to the last question is ‘no’: It needs more than a 
skilled dialogue-facilitator – in our case, a philosophical 
practitioner – in order to have a good dialogue. If a good dialogue 
would solely depend on skills, techniques and methods and their 
proper application then it would not only be ‘predictable’ what a 
philosophical practitioner has to do in order to ‘produce’ a good 
dialogue, but also the result and outcome of a dialogue would be, at 
least in certain respects, predictable. However, isn’t it one of the 
key-features of a philosophical dialogue that its outcome is not 
predictable, and furthermore, that most (if not all) dialogue 
methods in philosophical practice rely to a great extent on 





A good dialogue is like a good jazz performance 
 
A good dialogue might be comparable with a good jazz 
performance: The key-feature of such a performance lies in the 
spontaneous interaction – the improvisation – between the 
musicians. And though jazz musicians in general have brilliant 
playing skills, the skillful capability of playing an instrument 
cannot account alone for good improvisation. And this appears to 
be the same in a dialogue, which also can be understood as a 
                                                          
8 LINDSETH, Anders: “Being Ill as an Inevitable Life Topic. Possibilities of 
Philosophical 
Practice in Health Care and Psychotherapy“, in WEISS, Michael Noah (ed.): The Socratic 
Handbook. Dialogue Methods for Philosophical Practice, LIT Publishing, Vienna, 2015. 
PHILOSOPHICAL MINDFULNESS 
HASER. Revista Internacional de Filosofía Aplicada, nº 8, 2017, pp. 91-123 
97 
spontaneous form of interaction between the dialogue participants: 
A philosophical practitioner might have extraordinary knowledge 
in philosophy as well as expertise and knowledge of different 
dialogue methods, but this gives little predictive value as to 
whether the dialogue that he or she is facilitating will be inspiring 
and giving.  
 
 
The Art of Improvisation 
 
One of the reasons why knowledge in philosophy, as well as 
expertise in dialogue practices, cannot account alone for a giving 
and inspiring dialogue is because the ‘art’ of improvisation cannot 
be taught. If it would be, then it would not be improvisation. 
Improvisation – at least to a certain degree – can be understood as 
the way in which one deals with unexpected situations. There are 
certainly situations that we are unexpectedly confronted with, 
which simply make us scared – and then we would go into ‘fight-, 
flight- or freeze’-mode. The ‘art’ of improvisation on the other 
hand would mean that we would try to ‘make the best out of the 
situation’. This already indicates that there are two principal 
attitudes towards unexpected situations: On the one side of the 
spectrum we find the more ‘negative’ attitude, meaning that one is 
trying to ‘get out of this situation’. On the other side there is the 
more ‘positive’ attitude, meaning that one is trying to embrace and 
value the unexpected situation by seeing its chances and potentials 
by trying to deal with it more actively. To call this ‘positive’, 
improvising attitude an ‘art’ seems to be far fetched, however. 
First, because it seems to have little to do with Aristotle’s techné, in 
the sense of craftsmanship and art – especially if we understand art 
in the previously suggested way where already in the beginning of 
the ‘production’ there is an idea of the ‘product’ that guides the 
whole process. On the contrary, the absence of such an idea of the 
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‘end product’ seems to be an inherent aspect of the nature of 
improvisation. Secondly, because it seems to be sheer nonsense to 
call improvisation an art form, like visual arts, decorative arts, 
digital arts, performing arts etc. However, if one takes a closer look 
at the etymological roots of the term ‘art’, then one will find that it 
traces back to the Sanskrit word rtih, which is translated with 
‘manner’ or ‘mode’
9
. In German, for example, the term Art still 
means ‘manner’ and ‘mode’. And also the Old English expression 
of thou art (‘you are’)
10
 relates to a mode of being. With this in 
mind it seems to be legitimate to speak of the art of improvisation 
in the sense of a mode of improvisation. And now we are 
eventually getting a better understanding of what jazz musicians 
are doing in a jazz performance: They are getting into a ‘mode’ – a 
‘mode of improvisation’. 
 
 
The Art of Philosophizing 
 
With the translation of the term ‘art’ in the sense of a mode, we can 
now continue and see whether we can use this concept of art also in 
the context of philosophical dialogues. The activity primarily done 
in a philosophical dialogue is the activity of philosophizing. And 
now we can ask, what do we actually understand by the term 
‘philosophizing’? This seems to be a delicate question. Some might 
say that philosophizing is a (reflective) activity in which one goes 
from the concrete to the more general and abstract (a movement in 
the thinking process that one can find in the Socratic method after 
Leonard Nelson, for example
11
). Others would say that 
                                                          
9 ONLINE ETYMOLOGY DICTIONARY: “art” available in 
HUhttp://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=artUH (last access July 11th 2016) 
10 DICT.CC: “thou art” available in HUhttps://www.dict.cc/?s=thou+artUH (last access 
July 11th 2016) 
11 see WEISS, Michael N. (ed.): The Socratic Handbook. Dialogue Methods for 
Philosophical Practice, LIT Publishing, Vienna, 2015. 
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philosophizing means to investigate general aspects of the human 
condition, like freedom, responsibility, meaning etc.
12
 For the 
purpose of this essay however, I suggest a more literal 





Philosophy in its literal translation means the love of wisdom 
(philo-sophia). A philosopher is a friend of wisdom. And to 
philosophize would then simply mean to love or to be fond of 
wisdom (as an aside it can be noted that all these three terms – 
philosophy, philosopher, philosophizing –  suggest a positive 
emotional disposition towards wisdom, rather than its ownership or 
acquisition). However, what wisdom (sophia) is and what it is not, 
is again, a challenging question. Intuition tells us what it is not: 
knowledge – if wisdom would simply be mere knowledge then it 
can be acquired and ‘owned’ (and then philosophers would be 
called sophists), but it does not seem to be that easy with wisdom. 
And also, a person who has great knowledge of something is not 
necessarily a wise person. Further help can be found with Aristotle 
who offers some valuable categorization. He differed between 
theoretical wisdom (sophia)
13
 and practical wisdom (phronesis)
14
. 
While theoretical wisdom – in short and simple terms – is rather 
concerned with the understanding of the cosmos
15
, practical 
wisdom is concerned with a proper, that is, virtuous understanding 
of a given situation qua action
16
. In other words, sophia is a 
wisdom related to the general, while phronesis is a wisdom related 
                                                          
12 TEICHMANN, Jenny & EVANS, Kathrine C., Philosophy – A Beginner’s Guide, 
Blackwell, Oxford, 1999, p. 1. 
13 see ARISTOTLE: Nichomachean Ethics, 1141. 
14 see ibidem, 1140. 
15 see ibidem, 1141. 
16 see ibidem, 1140. 
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to the concrete situation, but both forms of wisdom are about 
understanding (which is not necessarily the same as knowing).  
 
 
Sophia vs. phronesis 
 
An assumption that I would like to introduce now is that 
philosophizing – and with that the facilitation of philosophical 
dialogues – can but does not have to be about sophia, that is, 
theoretical wisdom (i.e. a dialogue can be about virtuousness, 
which rather can be attributed to phronesis than to sophia). 
However, philosophizing is always – at least in a certain respect – 
about phronesis, that is, practical wisdom. What is meant by that? 
A philosophical dialogue can but does not have to be about certain 
aspects of the cosmos, about certain aspects of the human being in 
the world – this is not a necessity. A philosophical dialogue can 
also be about practical wisdom, that is, about questions concerned 
with what one ought to do in a given situation. However – and this 
is my central point – a philosophical dialogue is, or let us better say 
should always be, concerned with phronesis. With that I do not 
intend to say that the topic of a dialogue always has to be about 
certain aspects of practical wisdom, but that in a dialogue, practical 
wisdom should always be an issue qua action – otherwise a 
dialogue as such cannot take place. It is the ethical dimension put 
into practice between and among the dialogue partners that is 
addressed here. But in order to explain what is meant with 
phronesis being an essential dimension in a dialogue, we first have 
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The Community of Inquiry 
 
If a philosophical dialogue – in a metaphorical sense – is 
understood like some kind of ‘canvas’ for the activity of 
philosophizing, then we have to ask, what this ‘canvas’ has to be 
like in order to ‘hold and depict the colors’ put onto it in the 
creative process of philosophizing. The question here is, what are 
the inherent ethical ‘frameworks’ of a dialogue in order to hold the 
‘canvas’ steady on which the (art of) philosophizing takes place? 
And here of course one can also ask, what is a dialogue? In short 
terms – and with respect to Matthew Lipman’s Community of 
Inquiry concept
17
 – a dialogue is a format of communication in 
which a topic, a question, a phenomenon etc. is investigated 
together with others (in a group)
18
. The emphasis here is on 
‘together’ (and in a sense, I can also have a dialogue together with 
myself). In this respect, an often-used metaphor to explain what a 
dialogue is, is the one of the Elephant and the Blind Scientists
19
: A 
group of blind scientists who never saw an elephant before 
(because how could they, since they are blind) are brought to an 
elephant. Each scientist is then touching a different part of the 
elephant. When asked what an elephant is, the one who is holding 
the trunk would say ‘An elephant is like a snake’, the one who is 
embracing a leg would say ‘An elephant is like a tree’, the one who 
is touching the ear of the elephant would say ‘An elephant is like a 
fan’, and so on. If we would ask now ‘Which one of the scientists is 
right?’ then we would simply pose the wrong question. In fact, all 
of the scientists are partly right and a deeper understanding of an 
                                                          
17 see LIPMAN, Matthew: Thinking in Education, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2003, p. 84. 
18 see WEISS, Michael Noah: “Ethical Guidelines for Philosophical Dialoguing? From 
Global Ethic Towards a Professional Ethics for Philosophical Practice”, in Journal of the 
American Philosophical Practice Association, Nr. 3, Vol. 10, 2015. 
19 see SHIELDS, Patricia M.: "The Community of Inquiry: Classical Pragmatism and 
Public Administration”, in Administration & Society, Nr. 5, Vol. 35, 2003, p. 513. 
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elephant is can only be approached when putting all of these 
different views together. When reframing this metaphor of the 
Elephant and the Blind Scientists into the context of dialoguing, 
then one of the main characteristics of a dialogue is that different 
views are not only allowed but also actually necessary in order to 
get a deeper understanding of the topic or the phenomenon under 
investigation. In this respect a dialogue is different from a 
discussion or a debate, where it often is about finding the best 
argument or winning the debate.  A dialogue is not a competition 
you win. If one dialogue participant starts to try to ‘win’ the 
dialogue or to find the best argument and the others join this 
‘competition’, then they would still communicate with each other, 
but the dialogue and the joint exploration as such would have 
ceased to exist. A dialogue is rather a form of investigative 
cooperation. And with the emphasis on the term ‘cooperation’ it is 
a fundamentally ethical or a phronetic enterprise – and it is in this 
sense, why a dialogue is or should always be concerned with 
phronesis. In this respect, Kenneth Seeskin can be mentioned, who, 
in his book “Dialogue and Discovery”, states “If nothing else, 
dialogue requires cooperation with another person, which, in turn, 
requires appropriate forms of behavior. This entire way of looking 
at knowledge comes to a head in the Socratic dictum that virtue is 
knowledge.”
20
 With what Seeskin calls the ‘Socratic dictum’ here, 
he is referring to a passage in Plato’s dialogue Meno, in which 
Meno and Socrates investigate the nature of virtue
21
. Interestingly, 
certain authors like Shaun Gallagher have suggested that in this 
passage the term ‘virtue’ can be translated with phronesis and 
‘knowledge’ in terms of self-knowledge
22
. With this in mind, let us 
                                                          
20 SEESKIN, Kenneth: Dialogue and Discovery. A Study in Socratic Method, State 
University of New York Press, New York, 1987, p. 3f. 
21 see PLATO: Meno, 96d. 
22 see GALLAGHER, Shaun: Hermeneutics and Education, Suny Press, Albany, NY, 
1992, p. 198f. 
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The phronetic attitude of Socrates 
 
When taking a closer look at the Socratic dialogues of Plato, then 
one most likely comes to the conclusion that it is the figure of 
Socrates himself, who establishes the framework for the authentic 
philosophizing in these dialogues. To be more precise, it is 
Socrates’ attitude towards the dialogue as such, and of course 
towards his dialogue partner, which seems to be decisive for the 
progress and the course of the respective dialogue. And this attitude 
of Socrates – surely presented in an idealized way by Plato – can be 
understood to be ethical and virtuous in its essence. With this 
however, I do not intend to say that Socrates was acting according 
to certain moral norms, rules or principles. Rather, he showed a 
true concern for the topic of the dialogue, as well as for his 
interlocutors
23
. In this way, one could say that Socrates was 
concerned with the given situation in which the dialogue happened. 
To take it a step further, one could even claim that Socrates was 
acting phronetically both in the situation of the dialogue as well as 
towards his dialogue partners (and towards himself), or, to put it 
into the words of Seeskin: “The dialogues present him [Socrates] as 
a man with deep moral convictions”
24
. However, when referring 
the attitude of Socrates, which he adopted in his dialogues, to the 
term phronesis, then it has to be explained what is meant by it here. 
Phronesis (practical wisdom), as previously mentioned, is about 
doing good and acting virtuously in the given situation, with 
                                                          
23 see SEESKIN, Kenneth: Dialogue and Discovery. A Study in Socratic Method, State 
University of New York Press, New York, 1987, p. 3. 
24 ibidem, p. 8. 
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regards to the aim of living a good life overall
25
. If phronesis is 
understood in this way, then Socrates seems to have possessed this 
kind of wisdom, or let us better say this practically wise attitude. 
Examining life with regards to live a good and virtuous life overall 
was the reason why he engaged in these dialogues in the first 
place
26
. In these dialogues, Socrates stayed true to himself, but he 
was also open-minded, he had an authentic interest in the topic 
under investigation, and he never made anyone look like a fool just 
for the fun of it – it was not really Socrates, but the course of the 
dialogue, which made others look like fools because they were 
obviously not as wise as they thought they would be. And that can 
also be read as a sign that they were not as phronetic as Socrates, 
when being ‘trapped’ in aporia – because if they would have been, 
they would have had admitted that they would know that they knew 
nothing, just like Socrates. And here humbleness, as an ethical 
dimension of the Socratic wisdom of ignorance, comes to the fore. 
But humbleness alone does not make phronesis. When one takes a 
look at how phronesis is translated in the respective philosophical 
literature, then we find terms like prudence or moral knowledge
27
, 
for example. However, prudence can easily be misunderstood in 
terms of cautiousness and moral knowledge can easily be mixed up 
with some kind of knowledge about morals. Therefore, both 
translations do not really seem to fit when talking about the 
phronetic attitude of Socrates – he was neither cautious nor did he 
claim any knowledge about morals. A more proper translation, as it 
seems, is offered by McEvilley: In his extensive work on Ancient 
Greek philosophy titled with “The Shape of Ancient Thought”, he 
translates phronesis with the term mindfulness
28
.  
                                                          
25 see PLATO: Meno, 88c. 
26 see PLATO: Apology, 38a. 
27 GALLAGHER, Shaun: Hermeneutics and Education, Suny Press, Albany, NY, 1992, 
p. 197. 
28 see McEVILLEY, Thomas: The Shape of Ancient Thought, Allworth Press, New York, 
NY, 2002, p. 609. 
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Phronesis as mindfulness 
 
At first sight one might be a bit confused with the translation of 
phronesis as mindfulness, since mindfulness rather reminds of the 
same-named and currently popular training-approach for personal 
growth, which is rooted in certain Buddhist practices
29
. However, if 
one agrees with Dorothy Tarrant when stating that “The essence of 
dialogue lies in the interaction of human minds”
30
, then mindfulness 
does not appear to be entirely out of place with regards to 
dialoguing. Furthermore, when one looks closer then Socrates 
seems to have been mindful in the true sense of the word. Not only 
because he was ‘full of minds’, but he also ‘fully minded’ his 
dialogues, as well as his interlocutors. And here two fundamental 
dimensions of mindfulness are revealed: First, a reflective 
dimension and second, a caring dimension. To be mindful of 
something (i.e. of what others say and express in a dialogue as well 
as of my own thoughts, ideas and intuitions) means on the one hand 
to take it into consideration, – and this would relate to the reflective 
dimension of mindfulness. On the other hand, to be mindful can 
also be understood in the sense of taking care of something or 
somebody – which would relate to the caring dimension of 
mindfulness (i.e. mindful listening in a dialogue can be understood 
as caring for what is said and expressed by others, which might not 
simply be thoughts, but also feelings, beliefs, life stances, hopes 
and fears etc.). In short, the caring dimension of mindfulness means 
to care about others and their concerns, to take them seriously, and 
to respond to them in a respons-ible way
31
. One can find this caring 
                                                          
29 see HARRINGTON A. & DUNNE, J. D.: "When mindfulness is therapy: Ethical 
qualms, historical perspectives", in American Psychologist, Nr. 7,  Vol. 70, 2015. 
30 TARRANT, Dorothy: “Style and Thought in Plato Dialogues”, in Classical Quarterly, 
Nr. 42, 1948, p. 28. 
31 see FRANKL, Viktor E.: Man’s search for ultimate meaning, Perseus Publishing, 
Cambridge, MA, 2000, p. 29. 
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dimension with Socrates in a dialogue with Protagoras, for 
example:  
 
Protagoras: I don’t think it is quite so simple, Socrates, so that I should 
grant that justice is holy and holiness just. It seems to me there is a 
distinction here. But what difference does it make? If you wish, let us 
agree that justice is holy and holiness just.  
Socrates: Oh, no! I don’t want t examine this ‘If you like’ or ‘If you 
think’ but to examine you and me. When I say ‘you and me’ I mean that 




With this passage it is pointed out that Socrates was not interested 
in ‘logical games’ or in hypothetical ‘ifs’. On the contrary, he was 
interested and concerned with the topic under investigation as well 
as with the person he is investigating this topic with. In this way, 
mindfulness appears to have little to do with mere theorizing, rather 
it seems to be a certain kind of awareness – a fundamental attitude 
towards the given situation and towards the people who are 
involved. With reference to this passage in the dialogue Protagoras, 
Seeskin states that 
 
What is at stake in a Socratic dialogue is not, at least not primarily, the 
logical relations between propositions but the interaction of moral agents. 
That is what Socrates means when he refuses to allow Protagoras to use 





At this point, one might interpose that phronesis is not only about 
an attitude towards or an awareness of the given situation in the 
sense of knowing how to act good and virtuously in that respective 
situation. Phronesis as introduced in the Socratic dialogues of 
                                                          
32 see PLATO: Protagoras, 331c. 
33 SEESKIN, Kenneth: Dialogue and Discovery. A Study in Socratic Method, State 
University of New York Press, New York, 1987, p. 3. 
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 or in the Nichomachean Ethics of Aristotle
35
 is also 
concerned with living a good and virtuous life overall. How is this 
eudaimonic characteristic of phronesis ‘echoed’ in the term 
mindfulness? The answer seems to be rather simple and it was 
already outlined in the  remarks about the phronetic attitude of 
Socrates: The fundamental reason why the figure of Socrates can 
be called mindful (in the sense as described here) is because he 
truly cared about life and how to live it. Until the end of his life he 
was driven to figure that out, which is also reflected in his famous 
proverb “The unexamined life is not worth living”
36
. In other 
words, his concern to live a good and virtuous live overall – that is, 
to pursue eudaimonia in a ‘sustainable’ way, as it were – was the 
reason why he employed (or better, could employ) a mindful 
attitude in the first place. Therefore, in terms of phronesis the 
philosophical mindfulness as presented here, can be seen as being 
intimately linked with an eudaimonic perspective or dimension – it 
represents the motivational framework for being mindful in the 
concrete and given situation. With that, it seems to be this 
eudaimonic perspective, which is the ‘trigger’ when having or 
facilitating a philosophical dialogue, for example. Without that 
perspective a true and authentic concern for the topic and its 
investigation may vaporize in the long run.  
 
 
The art of philosophizing as a phronetic mode of being 
 
With these remarks on the phronetic attitude of Socrates, one can 
conclude that: If one speaks of the art of philosophizing in the 
sense of a mode of philosophizing (as it was previously suggested), 
then this mode has to be a phronetic mode – a phronetic mode of 
                                                          
34 see PLATO: Meno 87d–89a. 
35 see ARISTOTLE: Nichomachean Ethics, 1097a. 
36 PLATO: Apology, 38a. 
MICHAEL NOAH WEISS 
 
HASER. Revista Internacional de Filosofía Aplicada, nº 8, 2017, pp. 91-123 
108 
 
being in a dialogue. The decisive question now is, are philosophical 
practitioners always in this phronetic mode when being in a 
dialogue? Are they always mindful (as described above), when 
facilitating dialogues? An important remark in this respect seems to 
be Aristotle’s notion that phronesis is a question of experience and 
“experience is the fruit of years”
37
. Related to a phronetic art of 
philosophizing (to call it like that), this would mean that the 
phronetic capacity of a philosophical practitioner would develop 
due to his or her experience, and over time. But is this true? Can 
younger or more inexperienced practitioners not adopt a phronetic 
attitude in their dialogues? And, as a consequence, would that mean 
that the dialogues they facilitate are rather ‘poor’ and ‘weak’ and of 
less quality? No, by far not. Experience is an advantage, for sure, 
but what seems to be of even greater importance is the intention of 
whether one is willing to be mindful in the dialogue facilitation. 
For example, one of the key features of the figure of Socrates in 
this respect, was his knowing of not knowing – this awareness of 
his unawareness which did not keep him from being curious, 
wondering, critical and interested in the topics under investigation. 
On the contrary, it even seems that this awareness of his 
unawareness was the reason why he could keep on having such a 
mindful attitude. In other words, Socrates knew his limitations, but 
in the writings of Plato it appears that this was not a problem for 
him. It does not seem that he was lacking confidence. And this 
awareness of his unawareness seem to have sparked his 
philosophical investigations and the way he performed dialogues. 
And here we come back to the actual art of philosophizing, which 
seems to be deeply rooted in the wisdom of ignorance. Only due to 
this wisdom of ignorance, Socrates could keep on being curious, 
wondering, critical, but also authentic and humble. It kept him 
investigating, questioning and reflecting. In other words, an 
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authentic concern for the topic – for the issue at stake – as well as 
for dialogue participants appears to be decisive in order to perform 
and facilitate good dialogues
38
. Of course, as the facilitator of a 
philosophical group dialogue – performed for example by means of 
the Socratic method after Nelson
39
 – one’s role is not to engage in 
the dialogue like other group participants, in terms of sharing 
personal stories, ideas or opinions. Nevertheless, an authentic 
concern and interest for the topic is still of high relevance for the 
dialogue facilitator too, since it makes it easier for him or her to 
‘keep an ear to the ground’. That is, to listen carefully to what is 
expressed in the course of a dialogue, to sense important aspects, 
which can be further investigated, to pose helpful questions and of 
course to take care of the dialogue process as a whole etc. If a 
young or rather inexperienced philosophical practitioner has this 
authentic concern for the topic and the participants of a dialogue, 
and if he or she is aware of his or her not-knowing position, then 
these are important preconditions for that practitioner to perform 
the art of philosophizing (as presented here) too. On the other hand, 
if an experienced philosophical practitioner lacks an authentic 
concern for the topic under investigation, as well as for his or her 
‘co-investigators’ and is rather ‘bored’ with one of the two, or with 
both, then it might be hard to sense this phronetic mode of being in 
a dialogue with him or her. The lack of concern and interest can be 
a result of routine. Philosophical investigations, like Socratic 
dialogues, Philo Cafés, Philosophical Counseling etc. might be 
performed and facilitated by a philosophical practitioner on a daily 
basis in order to earn a living. Philosophical topics or questions like 
‘What is freedom?’, ‘Has life meaning?’, ‘How to live life in a 
responsible way?’ etc. might be – though by different people – 
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investigated in a practitioner’s praxis regularly. If a practitioner 
then looses his or her interest in the actual philosophizing process 
and instead solely resorts to applying certain techniques, methods 
and standardized procedures, then the activity performed by this 
practitioner rather resembles some sort of technè than praxis – 
philosophical practice, in this case. Of course, no practitioner is 
immune from falling prey to such a situation caused by everyday 
work routines. But why such a situation is far from the art of 
philosophizing appears to be obvious. Another trap in this respect 
can be a philosophical practitioner’s own experience. Though 
Aristotle assumed that phronesis is a question of experience and 
that “experience is the fruit of years”
40
, it can be precisely because 
of these years of experience, which a practitioner might have with 
philosophical investigations that he or she becomes overconfident 
and forgets about his or her knowing of not-knowing. And that, 
again, would counter the art of philosophizing, since such a self-
confident attitude with a practitioner would rather resemble the 
attitude one finds with some of Socrates’ interlocutors, who were 
convinced they were wise – whereas in fact they were not.  
 
 
Poiesis vs. praxis 
 
With these remarks on the art of philosophizing in terms of a 
phronetic mode of being in a dialogue, I intended to approach the 
essence of philosophical practice. And this essence seems to have 
something to do with the facilitation and the performance of 
dialogues – not only because more or less all philosophical 
practitioners are concerned with dialogue facilitation when doing 
philosophical practice, but also because the facilitation of dialogues 
seem to be a central feature when comparing philosophical practice 
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with other approaches like psychotherapy or coaching
41
. To make 
this point more clear, a distinction from Aristotle seems to be 
useful. He differed between two kinds of concepts of action: The 
first he called poiesis and the other praxis
42
. Poiesis is the activity 
that is performed, when the goal of this activity is beyond the 
activity itself. An example here would be to build a house – the 
building process is not the goal but it is the finishing of the house. 
Praxis on the other hand is an activity done for its own sake. An 
example here would be to go for a walk, to relax, to listen to music 
– or to philosophize
43
. As a consequence, if the activity of 
philosophizing is assigned to praxis and if philosophical practice is 
assumed to be concerned with philosophizing then a philosophical 
practitioner’s main concern is – or should be – the facilitation of 
philosophical investigations and dialogues (because what else 
could it be then?) At first sight this might appear to be problematic, 
since it makes it rather impossible to assign philosophical practice 
to the field of counseling professions: Though the field of 
counseling (including life counseling, business coaching etc.) is 
quite diverse by today, its general intention – as its name suggest – 
is to give counsel. And with that the activity of counseling has its 
goal beyond itself and resembles a poietic activiy. On the other 
hand, it is precisely this point that makes it possible to differ 
philosophical practice from psychotherapy, coaching and 
counseling: While psychotherapy is rather about healing and curing 
scars of the heart, and coaching is about improving or resolving a 
problematic situation, for example (which means that both 
approaches have their goals beyond the actual activities of treating 
or coaching, and with that rather resemble poiesis), philosophical 
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practice has its goal within itself, that is, the goal of philosophizing 
is to philosophize, to investigate the mind. And with that 
philosophical practice rather resembles praxis
44
. Whether 
philosophical practice indeed has its goal within itself, is heavily 
debated
45
. For example, what if a guest visits a philosophical 
practitioner because she currently suffers from a lack of meaning in 
her life? Cannot a philosophical practitioner help her? The point is 
that this question is simply the wrong one. If philosophical practice 
is about solving existential problems, then it has to be assigned to 
poiesis and not to praxis. As a consequence, philosophical practice, 
strictly speaking, would not deserve to be called a practice then. Of 
course, it would answer several questions at once, if philosophical 
practice would indeed be about problem-solving and the like: First, 
it would be much easier to market it towards potential customers 
because they would know in advance what kind of ‘product’ or 
benefit they can expect (i.e. answers to urging existential questions, 
or improved performances in business companies). Second, and 
with regards to the assumption that all philosophical practitioners 
want to perform good dialogues (as described in the very beginning 
of this essay), it would also be much easier to conclude what it 
takes in order to have a good dialogue – it would be its results, for 
example, that a solution to the problem under investigation can 
been found. Good dialogues could then be differed from ‘weak’ or 
‘poor’ dialogues in terms of their outcomes. And good 
philosophical practitioners would then be those who can ‘deliver’ a 
needed solution for a problem in a simple, fast and comprehensible 
way. But, in order to stay true to what philosophical practice claims 
to be, namely to be a practice, we have to refrain from these 
tempting interpretations in terms of poiesis. However, if one agrees 
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with this distinction between poiesis and praxis, and that the 
assignment of philosophical practice should fall into the realm of 
the latter, then the question is more than legitimate to ask why one 
should visit a philosophical practitioner, if one cannot expect any 
concrete outcome from such a visitation (since philosophical 
practice is not a poietic activity). In this respect the philosophical 
practitioner Detlef Staude states that he is 
 
pleading to take Aristotle seriously, as he points at a deep difficulty in 
today’s society, where we find it hard to get to rest, because we are 
constantly trying to reach aims. Perhaps the true power of philosophy lies 
in its being centered in itself. This could be the power so many people 
nowadays are looking for. Philosophical practice is a dialogue, which 
brings nearer to freedom and closer to oneself. It is not a tool for success 
nor is it a tool for anything else. To be human does not just mean to be a 
homo faber, to be someone who only pursues purposes and uses the 
power of thinking for reaching these purposes. Purposes are always 
ambivalent, have different aspects and implications. So one shouldn’t say 
that philosophical practice is ‘the application of philosophy’, because 
saying so suggests that philosophy is a tool for a purpose, but the purpose 
itself has nothing to do with philosophy. However, philosophizing is 
deeply human, it is not the poiesis of something, but the praxis of a free 
human being. And as it is this free praxis, to exercise it can bring us to 







If philosophical practice is not a poietic activity, as i.e. 
psychotherapy or coaching in fact are, but rather a dialogical praxis 
then the question is, what are the competences of a philosophical 
practitioner in this respect – if he or she has any competences at 
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all? This question seems to be legitimate, since philosophical 
practice in one way or another understands itself as a profession 
(for example, when comparing itself with psychotherapy or 
coaching, as documented in the respective literature
47
). And in 
order to pursue a certain profession, one has to have respective 
competences. One could now come to the conclusion that 
philosophical practitioners are some sort of dialogue experts and 
that they have the formal competence to facilitate dialogues on a 
professional level. This understanding would keep philosophical 
practice still within the scope of praxis and not ‘delivering’ it to 
poiesis. At the same time however, one can ask what this dialogical 
competence is about, if it is not a matter of techniques, methods 
and tools – in short, a matter of know-how or techné. And here we 
return to what has been discussed previously under The Art of 
Improvisation. There, art has rather been defined in the sense of a 
mode of being than in the sense of craftsmanship. And if we now 
take this understanding of art as well as Aristotle’s distinction 
between poiesis and praxis (and with that the distinction between 
techné and phronesis) into account, then we can conclude that the 
dialogical competences of a philosophical practitioner are not so 
much concerned with know-how and technical knowledge nor with 
problem-solving skills, but rather with an attitude – a phronetic 
attitude. In other words, the art of philosophizing is not simply a 
matter of dialogue techniques and communication skills – and that 
by learning these skills and techniques it would make one into a 
good philosophical practitioner. Rather, learning phronesis (or 
mindfulness, as it was translated previously) is a matter of self-
knowledge, as Shaun Gallagher points out, when investigating the 
passage in the Plato’s dialogue Meno, where Socrates and Meno 
reflect on how one can learn phronesis, if it is not teachable. In this 
respect, Gallagher states that, 
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Self-knowledge, which is intimately linked with phronesis and thinking 
for oneself, is clearly contrasted, not only to Meno’s reliance on 
memorized definitions, but to the type of knowledge offered by the 
Sophists. Even those Sophists, like Gorgias, who, through clever 
technique, could compose fine-sounding and memorable definitions do 
not represent for Plato the ideal of education. Education is more than 
rhetorical technique, as characterized by Plato. Rhetoric, as practiced by 
Sophists such as Gorgias, is a collection of purely formal techniques used 
to impress those who listen. As a formal technique is does not manifest 
moral involvement and concern for student, subject matter, or truth. If we 
define art (a term that in English once signified “learning”) as a practice 
that manifests such moral concern, then for Plato education has more to 
do with art than with formal, unconcerned techné. The notion that art or 
learning involves moral concern would not be irrelevant to the concept of 




These remarks of Gallagher offer valuable clues on what has been 
called the phronetic mode of being in a dialogue in this essay. First, 
Gallagher clearly dismisses the teaching of rhetorical techniques or 
communication skills (which he here attributes to the Sophists) as 
being sufficient for the learning of phronesis. Learning phronesis is 
a different type of education, so to say. It has to do with gaining 
self-knowledge, and only through self-knowledge a true moral 
involvement and concern “for student, subject matter, or truth”
49
 is 
possible. In other words and seen from Gallagher’s point of view, 
the phronetic attitude required by a philosophical practitioner in the 
facilitation of dialogues fundamentally relies on his or her will to 
gain self-knowledge. If it would only be about acquiring formal 
techniques then this would “not manifest moral involvement and 
concern”
50
. The second important remark that Gallagher makes 
here can be found at the end of his quote, where he states that, “If 
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we define art (a term that in English once signified ‘learning’) as a 
practice that manifests such moral concern, then for Plato education 
has more to do with art than with formal, unconcerned techné.”
51
 
With this statement, Gallagher clearly relates art to phronesis, 
however – and even more importantly it seems – he also links up 
art with learning. If we go along with Gallagher, then the art of 
philosophizing in the sense of a phronetic mode of being in a 
dialogue is about learning in and from the dialogue about oneself 
(that is, gaining self-knowledge). However this ‘learning about 
oneself’ is not meant in a self-centered, egoistic or even solipsistic 
way. On the contrary, it is centrally concerned with the question 
‘How do I relate to the dialogue participants and the topic under 
investigation – and what can I learn in that respect from the given 
situation’? This is what Gallagher means with moral concern and 
involvement, which according to him is not “irrelevant to the 
concept of virtue (areté) or phronesis.”
52
 If we now assume that art 
involves moral concern and involvement, and that it is related to 
phronesis, then we have to conclude that the art of philosophizing 
lays essentially in the learning of being sensitive and mindful when 
performing and facilitating dialogues. As a consequence, a 
philosophical practitioner would then never be, or become, an 
expert in the sense of someone who has certain competences that 
he or she could teach away. Rather, a philosophical practitioner 
would always remain a novice, a layman on the subject, which is 
precisely what the wisdom of ignorance tells us. But that does not 
mean that he or she does not have an eager, curious, wondering, 
brave and adventurous mind, that is, a true and authentic interest 
for the subject matter and for what other dialogue participants can 
contribute with, when investigating this subject. And with that we 
can summarize what has been said so far about the question 
guiding this essay, namely: ‘What skills or qualities with the 
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philosophical practitioner are required in order to perform and 
facilitate a good dialogue?’ 
 
 
Concluding and summarizing remarks 
 
The basic assumption on which the reflections of this essay are 
based is that one common feature among all philosophical 
practitioners is that they intend to create, perform and facilitate 
dialogues. In the further course of this essay it was then assumed 
that philosophical practitioners do not only intend to facilitate and 
perform dialogues but that they want to facilitate and perform good 
dialogues. Therefore, the guiding question of this essay was ‘What 
skills or qualities with the philosophical practitioner are required 
in order to perform and facilitate a good dialogue?’ 
In order to go into this question it first had to be clarified what 
is meant with a good dialogue. For that purpose, an analogy to the 
good life as introduces by Aristotle was made, where it was  
pointed out that just like the good life a good dialogue is more of a 
normative idea and rather empty of content.  
However, in order to assume a good dialogue as a normative 
idea it then had to be clarified what a dialogue as such actually is. 
In that respect the Community of Inquiry concept from Matthew 
Lipman was introduced
53
. According to this concept a dialogue 
means to investigate a topic or a phenomenon together, in order to 
get a deeper or broader understanding of it.  
In the course of this essay, a good dialogue was then compared 
with a good jazz performance. Such a performance is not only a 
question of playing skills and techniques mastered by the 
respective musicians. Rather, a good jazz performance is 
essentially characterized by the improvised interaction between the 
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musicians – it is the art of improvisation that makes a jazz 
performance a good one.  
The art of improvisation was then further examined and it was 
pointed out that this art is not so much a question of playing skills. 
Rather, it has been concluded that the art of improvisation has more 
to do with a mode – and musicians are in a certain mode of 
improvisation, when giving a good jazz performance. 
Understanding art in the sense of a mode of being is quite 
different from what Aristotle understood by the term. Nevertheless, 
with regards to the etymological roots of the term art it appeared to 
be legitimate to interpret art in the sense of a mode. In a next step it 
was then asked what the art of philosophizing, when understanding 
it as some kind of mode of philosophizing, would be about. 
For that purpose a closer look on the term philosophizing was 
taken and a rather literal translation of philosophy in the sense of 
philo-sophia (the love of wisdom) was taken into account. With 
regards to the term wisdom, it was pointed out that Aristotle 
differed between two kinds of wisdom: theoretical wisdom (sophia) 
and practical wisdom (phronesis). While theoretical wisdom was 
assumed – in general terms – to be concerned with an 
understanding of the cosmos and the human being in the world, 
practical wisdom was assumed to be concerned with an 
understanding about what ought to be done in a given situation in 
regards to live a good and virtues life overall.  
Based on this differentiation between sophia and phronesis it 
has been concluded that a philosophical dialogue can, but does not 
necessarily have to be about topics related to sophia. Phronesis, on 
the other hand, always does – or at least should – play a role in a 
dialogue, at least to a certain extent. In order to point out the 
intrinsic role of phronesis in a dialogue, a closer look at the ethical 
dimension inherent in a dialogue has been taken. Here it was 
concluded that if a dialogue in its essence is some sort of an 
investigative cooperation – a communicative interaction by which 
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something is investigated together – then this form of interaction 
would cease if its ethical dimension would be violated, i.e. when a 
dialogue turns into a debate or a discussion.  
In the further course of this essay, it was then asked for the 
relevance of phronesis in regards to this ethical dimension of a 
dialogue. In order to find answers, the dialogues of Socrates, as 
presented in the writings of Plato, were reflected. In these 
reflections it appeared that it was the attitude of Socrates, which he 
employed in these dialogues that essentially contributed to their 
course and their outcome. With reference to the wisdom of 
ignorance (‘I know that I know nothing’) it was concluded that the 
attitude of Socrates in his dialogues was a phronetic one.  
Based on these reflections, the art of philosophizing could be 
understood in the sense of a phronetic mode of being (in a 
dialogue). In order to further investigate this phronetic mode of 
being, a specific translation of phronesis was introduced, namely: 
phronesis as mindfulness (as suggested by McEvilley
54
). In this 
respect two central dimensions of mindfulness have been 
identified: a reflective dimension (i.e. to think critically, to reflect 
on one’s thoughts and intuitions, to examine one’s ideas) and a 
caring dimension (i.e. to care about what others say in a dialogue, 
to care for the topic under investigation) – and both dimensions 
appeared to be essential for the art of philosophizing in the sense of 
a phronetic mode of being in a dialogue. One of the conclusions 
then was that a philosophical practitioner, when intending to 
perform and facilitate a good dialogue, has to be mindful.  
The question then was whether facilitating good dialogues 
essentially relies on this mindful attitude with the practitioner, or 
whether certain communication skills and techniques would also be 
required and necessary. In this respect Aristotle’s differentiation 
between poiesis and praxis was introduced: poiesis as an activity, 
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which has its goal beyond this activity (i.e. building a house), and 
praxis as an activity, which has its goal within itself. If one goes 
along with this differentiation between poiesis and phronesis then 
i.e. psychotherapy can be attributed to the activity of poiesis: The 
goal of psychotherapy i.e. is healing and curing – and both healing 
and curing lay beyond the activity of therapeutic conversations. 
Philosophizing on the other hand has no goal beyond itself – its 
goal is not to solve a problem or to improve a given situation. Of 
course, solving a problem or improving a situation can be the 
outcome of philosophizing, but this rather has to be regarded as a 
side effect. Philosophizing – in a metaphorical sense – is like doing 
a walk into our mindscape, comparable to a walk in the woods after 
coming home from work. A walk into the woods will not solve the 
challenges we have at work, rather we do the walk because we 
enjoy being in nature, or for whatever other inherent reason. Of 
course, however, it can be that on such a walk an idea about how 
we can solve a certain problem at work comes to our mind 
spontaneously. But the activity of walking as such cannot guarantee 
that we in fact will find such a solution – that happens incidentally. 
With attributing the activity of philosophizing, and with that 
philosophical practice, to praxis, a delicate question comes to the 
fore: What kind of competences does – or at least should – a 
philosophical practitioner have, if he or she does obviously not 
have competences in order reach certain goals or ‘produce’ certain 
outcomes with his or her work? 
With this question the course of this essay returned to what has 
been called a phronetic mode of being as a certain quality of mind, 
so to speak. If we understand art with regards to its etymological 
roots in the sense of mode, then the art of philosophizing is a 
phronetic mode of being in a dialogue, that is, in simple words 
being mindful. In other words, the essence of a good dialogue is not 
about certain techniques or methods. Rather it is about a mindful 
attitude with which a philosophical practitioner is doing and 
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facilitating a dialogue. As a conclusion, good dialogues essentially 
depend on the facilitator and the participants being mindful (in the 
sense of being phronetic).  
The question was also raised what it could be that ‘triggers’ a 
philosophical practitioner in order to develop mindfulness (that is, 
phronesis). In connection with this question a quote from Shaun 
Gallagher’s “Hermeneutics and Eduation” was presented, in which 
he introduces three key-terms regarding phronesis: self-knowledge, 
art and learning
55
. Interestingly, Gallagher equals art with learning 
– learning in the sense as Plato actually meant it, namely as 
learning moral knowledge (which here is a translation of 
phronesis). And moral knowledge here can be interpreted as moral 
involvement and concern for the other dialogue partners, the 
subject matter and truth
56
. On the other hand, Gallagher also 
pointed out that learning phronesis is intimately connected with 
gaining self-knowledge. Hence, for the purpose of this essay, it can 
be concluded that the art of philosophizing as a phronetic mode of 
being in a dialogue is about learning in and from the dialogue 
about oneself (which is, gaining self-knowledge). And this 
‘learning about oneself’ is centrally concerned with the question 
‘How do I relate to the dialogue participants and the topic under 
investigation – and what can I learn in that respect from the given 
situation?’ And finally it appears to be the essence of this very 
question, which seems to be decisive for all philosophical 






                                                          
55 GALLAGHER, Shaun: Hermeneutics and Education, Suny Press, Albany, NY, 1992, 
p. 198f. 
56 see ibidem. 
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